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TAXATION - INCOME TAX - LIABILITY OF SETTLORS OF IRREVOCABLE SHORT TERM TRUSTS - In a recent significant decision 1
the Supreme Court of the United States has declared that, under certain circumstances, income from irrevocable short-term trusts may be
taxed to the settlor. This conclusion is contrary to the previously accepted notion that there was no authority for such a tax under existing
provisions of the Revenue Act. In the light of this and other recent decisions the matter of taxation of income from short-term trusts assumes
renewed significance.
I.

As a general rule, trusts have been treated as separate entities for
income tax purposes. In the ordinary case, the income from property
held in trust is taxable to the trustee or to the beneficiaries rather than
to the settlor. 2 This fact forms the basis for the employment of the
trust device as a means of escaping high surtaxes. The special utility of
this device is that it allows the settlor to retain varying degrees of
control over the trust property and its income, perhaps even enjoy its
economic benefit, although he has ostensibly parted with title and
ownership. It is easily understood why the history of the taxation of
trust income has been described as an unending struggle between taxpayers and the government. 8 Taxpayers and their counsel are continually seeking devices which, while permitting escape from surtaxes,
will yet allow the settlor maximum control over the trust property.
The treasury department, on the other hand, in seeking to close all
avenues of escape, believes it proper to tax settlors ·who retain control
over and receive the benefits from trust property. In certain cases, the
treasury's strategy has been to disregard the trust as a separate entity
for tax purposes. This nullifies the tax avoidance purpose by making
the trust income taxable to the settlor, contrary to the usual rule.
2.

Prior to I 924, an important means of retaining control was the
reservation by the settlor of a power to revoke the trust. So frequently
Helvering v. Clifford, (U.S. 1940) 84 L. Ed. 504, 60 S. Ct. 554.
Trust income is ordinarily taxable to the trustee, unless it is distributed currently
to the beneficiaries, in which case it is payable by them. Revenue Act of 1938, 52 Stat.
L. 519, § 162 (b), (c). Similar provisions were embodied in the previous revenue
acts, see 26 U.S. C. A. (Supp. 1939), § 162, note, and in the Revenue Act of 1939,
53 Stat. L. 66.
8 Clapp v. Heiner, (C. C. A. 3d, 1931) 51 F. (2d) 224. See also, Maxeiner,
"Reservation of Control by the Settlor of a Private Trust as Affected by Federal Tax
Legislation," 21 ST. Louis L. REV. 275 (1936); Paul, "The Background of the
Revenue Act of 1937," 5 UNiv. CH1. L. REv. 41 (1937); Warren, "The Reduction
of Income Taxes Through the Use of Trusts," 34 M1cH. L. REv. 809 (1936); Buck,
"Income Tax Evasion and Avoidance: The Deflection of Income," 23 VA. L. REv.
107 (1936), 265 (1937); :md Sutter and Owen, "Federal Taxation of Settlors of
Trusts," 33 M1cH. L. REv. u69 (1935).
1
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was this method resorted to that it became clear that unless this means
of escape were closed the surtax would lose much of its effectiveness:4
An attempt to close the door was made by a provision in the Revenue
Act of 1924,5 which has been repeated in subsequent acts, taxing the
settlor on income from trusts over which-he reserved a power to revest
title in himself. However, the wording of the original provision left an
obvious loophole,6 and not until amendment in 1934 7 was the gap
effectively closed. As presently worded, section 166 goes far towards
placing the incidence of the tax on settlors whose control consists of a
power to revoke.
But a high degree of dominion can be exercised on the part of
settlors without reserving a power of revocation. This is so where the
settlor is himself the trustee, or where the settlor has reserved the
power to direct the management and investment of the trust. And, if
the period for which the trust is created is short, the settlor will soon
reacquire the trust property.

3.
The treasury has for some time sought to tax the settlor on income
from irrevocable short-term trusts. It has contended that section 166
provided sufficient authority for such a tax, because there is "no practical difference between a revocable trust and one certain to be terminated soon." 8 That the language of section 166 does not expressly
4
"If income-producing estates could be parceled out among donees having incomes,
in such a way that the donor paid no tax, although he retained full powers of control
and recapture, the surtax would be deprived of efficacy••••" Judge Mack in Corliss
v. Bowers, (D. C. N. Y. 1929) 30 F. (2d) 135 at 136.
5
43 Stat. L. 277, § 219 (g) (1924), reenacted in Revenue Act of 1926, 44 Stat.
L. 34, § 219 (g), and Revenue Act of 1928, 45 Stat. L. 840, § 166. A similar provision was contained in the Revenue Act of 1932, 47 Stat. L. 221. This provision was
amended in 1934 and since then has been reenacted without change. Revenue Act of
1934, 48 Stat. L. 729; Revenue Act of 1936, 49 Stat. L. 1707; Revenue Act of
1938, 52 Stat. L. 519; Revenue Act of 1939, 53 Stat. L. 68.
6
Prior to 1934 the tax was imposed upon the grantor where he had power to
revest title in himself "at any time during the taxable year." Statutes cited in note 5,
supra. This opened th~ door to avoidance of the tax by the so-called "year-and-a-day''
trusts. Thus where the power of revocation was conditioned upon notice given a year
and a day precedent to revocation, it was held that the requisite power did not exist
"at any time during the taxable year." Lewis v. White, (D. C. Mass. 1932) 56 F.
(2d) 390; Langley v. Commissioner, (C. C. A. 2d, 1932) 61 F. (2d) 796.
7
The words "during the taxable year" were eliminated by the Revenue Act of
1934. Since then (statutes cited note 5, supra), sec. 166 provides: "Where at any time
the power to revest in the grantor title to any part of the corpus of the trust is vested( 1) in the grantor, either alone or in conjunction with any person not having a substantial adverse interest in the disposition of such part of the corpus or the income
therefrom, or (2) in any person not having a substantial adverse interest in the disposition of such part of the corpus or the income therefrom, then the income of such
part of the trust shall be included in computing the net income of the grantor."
8
Helvering v. Wood, (U.S. 1940) 84 L. Ed. 5n at 512, 60 S. Ct. 551.
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refer to reversions was conceded, but a practical construction of the
language was sought. In Helvering v. Wood, 9 the commissioner
argued "that it would not be sensible to impute to Congress a purpose
to impose the tax when the grantor has an executory power to revest
title in himself but to withhold the tax when the grantor, by provisions
in the trust deed, has already exercised that power." 1 ° Furthermore,
the existing income tax regulations under section 166 provide that a
grantor will be taxable on trust income whenever he may be regarded
as "in substance the owner of the corpus"; and he may be so regarded
where "in view of the essential nature and purpose of the trust, it is
apparent that the grantor has failed to part permanently and definitely
with the substantial incidents of ownership in the corpus." 11 The fol.
lowing example is given:
"A grantor is regarded as remaining in substance the owner of the
corpus of the trust, if he has placed it in trust for his son, John,
(A) for the term of three years, at the end of which time the
trust might be extended for a like period at the option of the
grantor and successively thereafter, but in the absence of such an
extension the title is once more to revest in the grantor in possession and enjoyment.•.." 12

H elvering v. Wood involved a trust in which the grantor declared himself trustee of securities for the benefit of his wife. As trustee, he was
empowered to hold, invest, or reinvest the securities and to collect the
income. On termination, which was to be in three years, or earlier in
case of the death of either the settlor or his wife, all property then held
in trust was to go to the settlor. No power of revocation was reserved.
The commissioner claimed that section 166 would support taxing the
income to the settlor. But the Supreme Court affirmed the decisions
of the board of tax appeals 18 and the Circuit Court of Appeals of the
Second Circuit 14 holding that the settlor could not be taxed under
section 166. In the opinion of the Supreme Court it was recognized
that a reversion and a power to revoke may be equivalent in "economic
fact," but it was concluded that Congress intended to preserve the
distinction between reversions and powers to revoke which exists in the
law of estates.15 Section 166 was confined to a special class of trusts(U. S. 1940) 84 L. Ed. 5u, 60 S. Ct. 551.
Ibid., 84 L. Ed. 5u at 512-513.
11 TREAS. REGS. 101, art. 166-1 (b) (1939).
12 Ibid.
18 Wood v. Commissioner, 37 B. T. A. 1065 (1938).
14 Commissioner v. Wood, (C. C. A. 2d, 1939) 104 F. (2d) 1013.
n The court cited I TtFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, 2d ed., 1049 ( I 920). See also,
United States v. First Nat. Bank of Birmingham, (C. C. A. 5th, 1934) 74 F. (2d) 360.
9

10
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those in which a power to revest was expressly reserved.16 Thus, in
construing the scope of a specific provision taxing a particular type of
trust, no reason was found for an interpretation based on "a broader
purpose than that expressed." 17 Regard was had for technical considerations, and the Court looked to the law of trusts and conveyances
to determine the meaning of the language used by Congress.

4.
Since the possibility of taxing settlors on income from irrevocable
short-term trusts under section 166 was thus foreclosed, the question
remained whether any other statutory provision would provide authority for such a tax. In H elvering v. Clifford,18 the settlor set up a fiveyear trust of securities for the benefit of his wife in which the settlor
was trustee. The powers retained by the settlor-trustee were substantially the same as those in H elvering v. Wood. As in the Wood case,
no power of revocation was reserved. The board of tax appeals 19 .sustained the commissioner's finding that the income was taxable to the
settlor, but this decision was reversed by the Circuit Court of Appeals
of the Eighth Circuit. 20 On certiorari, the Supreme Court 21 reversed
the circuit court of appeals and upheld the tax under section 22 (a)
of the Revenue Act of 1934.22 The Court concluded that section 22(a)
provided sufficient authority to tax the grantor on some short-term
trusts, thus making more specific authority unnecessary. The "broad
and sweeping'' language of that section indicated to the Court that
Congress there intended "to use the full measure of its taxing power
within those definable categories." 28 In order to reach a construction
16 Helvering v. Wood, (U. S. 1940) 84'L. Ed. SII at 513. See Warren, "The
Reduction of Income Taxes Through the Use of Trusts," 34 M1cH, L. REv. 309 at
817-820 (1936), for discussion of the inapplicability of section 166 to term trusts.
17 Helvering v. Wood, (U.S. 1940) 84 L. Ed. 5u at 513.
18 (U.S. 1940) 84 L. Ed. 504.
19 Clifford v. Commissioner, 38 B. T. A. 1532 (1938).
2 °Clifford v. Helvering, (C. C. A. 8th, 1939) 105 F. (2d) 586.
21 The opinion was written by Justice Douglas. Justice Roberts, with whom
concurred Justice McReynolds, delivered a dissenting opinion.
22 3ec. 22(a) of the Revenue Act of 1934, 48 Stat. L. 686, includes among
"gross income" all "gains, profits, and income derived ••. from professions, vocations,
trades, businesses, commerce, or sales, or dealings in property, whether real or personal,
growing out of the ownership or use of or interest in such property; also from interest,
rent, dividends, securities, or the transaction of any business carried on for gain or
profit, or gains or profits and income derived from any source whatever." The same
provision was reenacted in 49 Stat. L. 1657 (1936),. 52 Stat. L. 457 (1938), 53
Stat. L. 9 (1939). In its argument before the Supreme Court in Helvering v. Wood,
the government contended that sec. 22(a) would be likewise applicable to the trust
set up in that case. This contention was denied, because the commissioner had failed to
preserve this ground in his appeal. Helvering v. Wood, (U.S. 1940) 84 L. Ed. 5II
at 513-514.
28 Helvering v. Clifford, (U. S. 1940) 84 L. Ed. 504 at 506.
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in consonance with that purpose, the Court brushed aside technical
considerations so as not to obscure the basic issue.2' That issue was
whether the grantor could still be treated as the owner of the corpus,
in spite of the existence of the trust. According to the Court, the trust
device will be ignored and the settlor will be treated as owner for the
purposes of section 22(a), whenever the terms of the trust and circumstances surrounding its operation show that the creation of the
trust did not effect any substantial change in the dominion and control
of the settlor. No one fact is decisive, but the following are deemed
relevant to support a finding that the settlor is to be treated as owner
for tax purposes: a trust of short duration 25 for the benefit of the settlor's wife or close relative,26 in which the right of ultimate enjoyment
is reserved to the settlor, and in which the settlor is trustee with broad
powers of investment and reinvestment.27
In exposing family trusts to scrutiny, the court does not intend to
confine itself to an examination of "strictly legal rights." To determine
the extent of the settlor's control, account must be taken of the indirect
benefits accruing to the settlor by reason of the "intimacy of the familial
relationship." 28 If the settlor, by reason of these indirect benefits and
the practical control which the head of the household may exercise,
remains in substantially the same financial position after the trust as
before, he will be taxed as owner.29 The Court thus recognizes that
practical control and indirect benefits may, at times, mean as much as
legal title.
2

Ibid., 84 L. Ed. 504 at 506.
The problem is one of degree: "the income of a long term irrevocable trust
which committed the possession and control of the corpus to an independent trustee
would not likely be taxed to the settler merely because of a reversionary interest."
From a portion of the commissioner's brief quoted in Justice Roberts' dissenting
opinion, Helvering v. Clifford, (U. S. 1940) 84 L. Ed. 504 at 510, italics supplied
by Justice Roberts. See DuPont v. Commissioner, 289 U. S. 685 at 688-689, 53 S. Ct.
766 (1933), where Justice Cardozo discusses the element of short duration as bearing
on the settler's control.
26 "To hold otherwise would be to treat the wife as a complete stranger; to let
mere formalism obscure the normal consequences of family solidarity; and to force
concepts of ownership to be fashioned out of legal niceties which may have little or
no significance in such household arrangements." Helvering v. Clifford, (U. S. 1940)
84 L. Ed. 504 at 507.
27
Helvering v. Clifford, (U.S. 1940) 84 L. Ed. 504 at 506.
28
Helvering v. Clifford, (U. S. 1940) 84 L. Ed. 504 at 507. The Court continued, "where the head of the household has income in excess of normal needs, it may
well make but little difference to him (except income-tax-wise) where portions of that
income are routed-so long as it stays in the family group."
29
Helvering v. Clifford, (U. S. 1940) 84 L. Ed. 504 at 507. The Court cited
DuPont v. Commissioner, 289 U.S. 685 at 689, 53 S. Ct. 766 (1933), where it is
said: "One who retains for himself so many of the attributes of ownership is not the
victim of despotic power when for the purpose of taxation he is treated as owner
altogether."
'
25
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The Clifford decision will doubtless come as a surprise to those
who believed that specific legislation was necessary before irrevocable
short-term trusts could be taxed to the settlor. Such a belief was fortified by the treasury's unsuccessful attempt to achieve specific legislation on this matter.80 According to the dissenting opinion, what the
treasury failed to achieve by application to Congress, it gained by this
decision. But in the view of the majority, no additional authority beyond what is now in section 22(a) is needed to tax some short-term
trusts to the settlor. 81

5.

H elvering v. Clifford can be looked upon as an extension of the
doctrine of prior decisions whereby the trust entity has been disregarded for tax purposes when the settlor has retained such general
powers of control that the trust property may be used for his own
benefit.82 Irrespective of whether the trust was revocable or irrevocable,
the income therefrom has been taxed to the settlor where he has retained the "substance of enjoyment." 88 By the doctrine of constructive
receipt, it has been declared that a settlor may be taxed when he enjoys
the benefit of the income through the liquidation of a legal obligation; 84 and it is believed that this doctrine will support taxing the
settlor even though the obligation is not legally e_nforceable.35 These
conclusions are said to be justified on the basis of congressional intent.
80 Among the recommendations for legislation made by the treasury to the House
Ways and Means Committee when that committee was considering the Revenue Act
of 1934 was the following: "(6) The income from short-term trusts and trusts which
are revocable by the creator at the expiration of a short period after notice by him
should be made taxable to the creator of the trust." Congress adopted the recommendation as to revocable trusts (sec. 166), but did not accept the recommendation concerning short-term trusts. HEARINGS ON H. R. 7835, 73d Cong., 2d sess., p. I 5 I ( 1934);
H. REP. 1385, 73d Cong., 2d sess., p. 24 (1934). "It appears that the Treasury
Department not only considered legislation as necessary to tax the income of a trust for
a term of years, but it likewise appears that Congress refused to adopt the suggestion."
Clifford v. Helvering, (C. C. A. 8th, 1939) 105 F. (2d) 586 at 591-592.
81 "We should add that liability under § 22(a) is not foreclosed by reason of the
fact that Congress made specific provision in § I 66 for revocable trusts, but failed to
adopt the Treasury recommendation in 1934 ••• that similar specific treatment should
be accorded income from short term trusts. Such choice, while relevant to the scope of
§ 166 ••• cannot be said to have subtracted from § 22(a) what was already there.
Rather, on this evidence it must be assumed that the choice was between a generalized
treatment under § 22(a) or specific treatment under a separate provision (such as was
accorded revocable trusts under § I 66 ••. ) ; not between taxing or not taxing grantors
of short term trusts." Helvering v. Clifford, (U. S. 1940) 84 L. Ed. 504 at 507-508.
82 Wollman v. Commissioner, 31 B. T. A. 37 (1934); Rands v. Commissioner,
34 B. T. A. II07 (1936); O'Laughlin v. Commissioner, 38 B. T. A. II20 (1938).
88 Burnet v. Wells, 289 U.S. 670 at 677, 53 S. Ct. 761 (1933).
M Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716, 49 S. Ct. 499 (1929);
United States v. Boston & Maine R.R., 279 U.S. 732, 49 S. Ct. 505 (1929).
85 Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U. S. 1, 56 S. Ct. 59 (1935) (trust for the payment
of alimony); Helvering v. Schweitzer, 296 U. S. 551, 56 S. Ct. 304 (1935), per
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6.
The construction given section 22(a) in Helvering v. Clifford
emphasized substance rather than form, practical considerations rather
than refinements of title. 86 In this decision, the Court deemed the
purpose and policy of Congress to be the guideposts of construction.
Attention is called to four recent decisions of the Supreme Court in
which similar construction has been given tax statutes.87 In the past,
technical construction and judicial exclusion have left loopholes which
threatened to undermine the effectiveness of the acts. To close these
gaps required legislative action, and the estate and income tax statutes
were subjected to constant piecemeal amendment in order to meet each
new tax avoidance plan. Many of these amendments could have been
avoided had the courts construed the statutes in the light of the purpose of Congress and the apparent intention to prevent tax avoidance.

Robert M. Warren
curiam opinion reversing Schweitzer v. Commissioner, (C. C. A. 7th, 1935) 75 F.
(2d) 702 (trust for the support of the settlor's children).
86
See Burnet v. Wells, 289 U. S. 670 at 681-682, 53 S. Ct. 761 (1933).
Also, Maxeiner, "Reservation of Control by the Settler of a Private Trust as Affected
by Federal Tax Legislation," 21 ST. Lours L. REv. 275 at 292-293 (1936).
87
"But taxation is not so much concerned with the refinements of title as it is
with actual command over the property taxed-the actual benefit for which the tax is
paid." Justice Holmes in Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U. S. 376 at 378, 50 S. Ct. 336
(1930). See Justice Frankfurter's remarks upon the conflict between practical considerations and the "niceties of the art of conveyancing" in Helvering v. Hallock, (U. S.
1940) 60 S. Ct. 444 at 448. It is there said that the Supreme Court has "refused to
subordinate the plain purposes of a modern fiscal measure to the wholly unrelated
origins of the recondite learning of ancient property law."
88
In Pearson v. McGraw, 308 U. S. 313, 60 S. Ct. 2II (1939), the state of
Oregon was held to have jurisdiction over the subject of a gift consummated in contemplation of death by a sequence of interrelated transactions in Illinois which the
Court looked upon as an integrated plan to achieve a single purpose. The Court stated,
"to hold that there is a constitutional barrier ••• would be to make a fetish of form."
60 S. Ct. at 213.
Griffiths v. Helvering, (U. S. 1939) 60 S. Ct. 277, involved taxation of the
proceeds of a sale of stock which were routed through a corporation created by the
petitioner for this purpose. In upholding taxation of the petitioner the Court characterized the scheme as the "maintenance of effective benefit through the interposition
of a subservient agency." 60 S. Ct. at 278.
In Higgins v. Smith, (U. S. 1940) 60 S. Ct. 355 at 357, the Court denied
deductions by a taxpayer for losses on sale of securities to his wholly owned corporation: "transactions which do not vary control or change the flow of economic benefits
are to be dismissed from consideration."
Helvering v. Hallock, (U.S. 1940) 60 S. Ct. 444 at 451, upheld the inclusion
in gross estate, under sec. 302(c) of the estate tax, of a transfer in which the decedent
had reserved a contingent remainder: "Distinctions which originated under a feudal
economy ••• are peculiarly irrelevant in the application of tax measures. • ••" This
case is noted in 53 HARV. L. REV. 884 (1940).

